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The Samos E or SAMOS ("Satellite and Missile Observation System") program was a relatively short-lived series of reconnaissance satellites for the United States in the early 1960s, also used as a cover for the initial development of the KH-7 Gambit system. Reconnaissance was performed with film cameras and television surveillance from polar low Earth orbits with film canister returns and transmittals over the United States. Samos was first launched in 1960 from Vandenberg Air Force Base. SAMOS was also known by the unclassified terms Program 101 and Program 201. == History and costs == Samos started as part of the WS-117L satellite reconnaissance and protection program of the United States Air Force in 1956. In May 1958 the Department of Defense directed the transfer of the WS-117L program to ARPA. Significant parts of the Samos development program were Samos-E (visual reconnaissance), Samos-F (ELINT Ferret reconnaissance), and Samos-H (communications).〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=SAMOS Lockheed Missiles and Space Division (MSD) Satellite Systems Briefing, Part II, The SAMOS Program )〕 In FY1958 WS-117L was funded by the Air Force at a level of US$108.2 million (inflation adjusted US$ billion in ). For Samos, AF and ARPA spent a combined sum of US$82.9 million in FY1959 (inflation adjusted US$ billion in ) and US$163.9 million in FY1960 (inflation adjusted US$ billion in ).〔(【引用サイトリンク】 url=http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/WS117L_Records/52.PDF )〕 During this period, the rival CORONA program, which saw its first launch in February 1959, began operation. Samos emerged as a more advanced satellite with additional capabilities that due to its larger mass would be launched on the Atlas-Agena booster instead of the Thor-Agena. While CORONA took photographs and returned them to Earth in a film capsule, Samos would instead electronically scan its film and beam images down by radio link. The first Samos launch took place from SLCW 1-1 at Point Arguello Launch Complex (later absorbed into the main launch center at Vandenberg Air Force Base) on October 11, 1960. Atlas performance was nominal, but after Agena separation and staging, the launch vehicle began tumbling and reentered the atmosphere, ending its flight in the Pacific Ocean rather than orbit. Postflight analysis found that a pad umbilical failed to detach properly at liftoff, allowing the Agena's nitrogen pressure gas to escape. The stage was left without any attitude control and could not be stabilized properly for main engine start. Samos 2 was launched on January 31, 1961 and more-or-less accomplished its mission objectives, although the electro-optical camera system produced rather mediocre results. After a month in orbit, the satellite exhausted its attitude control gas and was shut off. It decayed into the atmosphere in 1971. The next attempt did not take place for nine months, in part because of the switch to the larger Agena B stage that could be restarted in orbit. Samos satellites after Samos 2 also sported a large "mushroom cap" nose cone, as early plans had envisioned flying a manned capsule similar to Mercury. When it finally happened, the result was a complete disaster. Samos 3 lifted from SLCW 1-1 on September 9, but the Atlas booster's engines shut down after the rocket had ascended 2 inches and it fell back onto the pad in a fiery explosion. Cause of the accident was a pad umbilical that detached 0.21 seconds too late, causing the launch vehicle to switch from internal to external power. Samos 3 was the last of the Program 101/101A satellites and the ambitious, but the premature attempt at digital photography was abandoned and would not be tried successfully until the KH-11 satellites 20 years later. After this, Samos switched to a more conventional film recovery capsule. While the 101/101A satellites separated from the Agena in orbit, the 101B would remain attached and would use it for orbital maneuvers and also deorbiting the film capsule at the end of the mission. As it turned out, SLCW 1-1 was not seriously damaged by the explosion of Samos 3's booster and repair work only consisted of plumbing and electrical equipment, replacing the launcher mechanism, and cleaning and repainting. By October 29, the pad was fully restored to working condition and on November 22, Samos 4, the first Program 101B satellite, lifted off. Unfortunately, the launch was another failure, albeit less dramatic than Samos 3. The Atlas suffered a guidance malfunction at T+245 seconds into launch that resulted in loss of pitch control. This did not prevent the sustainer engine from functioning normally and the booster completed its burn on time, followed by staging. However, the Atlas had pitched up about 160 degrees, leaving the Agena oriented in the wrong direction, so that when its engine fired, it reentered the atmosphere and broke up over the Pacific Ocean. Samos 5 was launched on December 22, but the Atlas malfunctioned yet again. This time, the sustainer engine did not cut off on schedule and continued operating until LOX depletion, putting the satellite into a high orbit, which resulted in the deorbit maneuver failing. The capsule separated and reentered the atmosphere on January 9. Samos 6 (March 6, 1962) finally had no booster problems, but the satellite's onboard attitude control system malfunctioned and ran out of propellant by the 22nd orbit. When the Agena stage fired for the deorbit maneuver, Samos 6 was launched into a high orbit instead, where it remained until reentering 15 months later. At this point, the idea of the recoverable capsule was abandoned and the electro-optical system put back into use. It proved no more successful than before and after another five Samos launches, the program was terminated. In addition, a side program was operated during this period (Program 102) which launched a modified Samos on the Thor-Agena with no cameras at all, but instead electronic monitoring equipment for detecting Soviet missile launches — what could be described as an early ELINT satellite. Four of these were launched from 1962 to 1963 with one failure when the first satellite's Agena failed to restart in orbit. The standard Samos apparently also carried ELINT subsatellites that remained attached to the Agena stage. Meanwhile, in November 1961, President Kennedy issued an executive order placing all Department of Defense space programs under strict secrecy. The initial DoD launches in 1959-61 were not quite secret, in part because President Eisenhower doubted the ability of the US military to keep a secret for very long. The existence of CORONA, Midas, and Samos were publicly acknowledged even if the DoD was evasive about their exact purpose, generally using cover stories like the programs being for scientific studies. However, Kennedy took a more rigid view of secrecy than his predecessor and all DoD programs from late 1961 onward were considered classified and top-secret. In any case, it was becoming increasingly difficult to explain to the public why these alleged scientific missions did not seem to be returning any data. Eventually, by 1963, the DoD did not officially acknowledge the existence of any space programs. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Samos (satellite)」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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